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THE COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID ACT: A
CASE STUDY IN THE LEGALITY OF ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS
Imposing economic sanctions to attain foreign policy objectives is a
common weapon in international relations.' Traditionally states have levied
economic sanctions to induce other states to observe international obliga-
tions.2 More recently, states have employed economic sanctions to change
1. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086-
116 (Act) (prohibiting certain economic interaction between United States and South Africa);
G. HUFBAUER, J. SCHOTT & K. ELuLoTT, EcONOMIc SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND
CURRENT POLICY 1 (1985) (hereinafter HUPBAuER & SCHOTT) (summarizing 103 cases of
economic intervention between 1914-1984); Perlow, Taking Peacetime Trade Sanctions to the
Limit: The Soviet Pipeline Embargo, 15 CASE W. REs. J. INT. L. 253, 253 (1983) (discussing
United States economic sanctions against Poland to lift martial law). An economic sanction is
a deliberate government-directed withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or
financial relations. HUFBAUER & SCHOT, supra, at 2.
In a study published by the Institute for International Economics, G. Hufbauer and J.
Schott divided the use of economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes into five categories,
classified according to the possible policy objective of the sender state. Id. The first objective
might be to change the target state's policies in a modest way, relative to the sender's national
goals. Id. A second objective might be to destabilize the target nation's government, including
changing both the foreign and domestic policy of a target nation. Id. A third objective could
be to disrupt a minor military adventure initiated by the target state. Id. The fourth objective
could be to impair the military potential of the target government. Id. The fifth objective
might be to change the target nation's foreign or domestic policy in a major way. Id. An
example of the fifth category is the United Nations' campaign against South Africa over
apartheid and South African control over Namibia. Id; see infra note 40 and accompanying
text (noting United Nations' actions relevant to apartheid).
2. See L. HINua, How NATIONS BEHA E 49, 93 (2d ed. 1979) (imposing economic
sanctions induces target nation to observe international obligations). An early example of the
use of economic sanctions occurred in 432 B.C., when Pericles, leader of Athens, limited the
entry of the products of Megara-a Greek city-into the Athenian marketplace in response to
the kidnapping of three women by Megaran townsmen. See HuFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note
I, at 4, 21 (describing early known use of ecconomic sanctions); C. Fonara, Plutarch and the
Megarian Decree, IN 24 YALE CLAssI AL Srtumis 222-26 (1975) (describing economic sanctions
in 432 B.C.). The records detailing the use of economic sanctions up to World War One
indicate that economic sanctions either foreshadowed or accompanied warfare. See HuFBAuER
& SCHorr, supra note 1, at 4 (summarizing use of economic sanctions through 1914). Since
World War One states frequently have used economic sanctions as a substitute for armed
hostilities or in conjunction with armed hostilities. Id. In recent years, states have used
economic sanctions with great regularity. See id. (identifing 103 cases of economic sanctions
between 1914-1984, and noting increased use of economic sanctions over past decade). For
example, in 1977 President Carter imposed a grain embargo against the Soviet Union as a
protest against the Soviet invasion of Afganistan. See Recent Developments, Apartheid and
Economic Sanctions, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 366, 368 (1981)(discussing President Carter's
grain embargo against Soviet Union). In 1982 Great Britain administered economic sanctions
against Argentina during the Falkland Island War. See Minter, South Africa: Straight Talk
on Sanctions, 65 FOREIGN PoL'y 43, 44 (1986-1987) (noting British sanctions against Argentina
during wartime). In 1986 President Reagan issued an executive order banning all export and
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internal policies of a target state.3 Despite frequent employment of economic
sanctions by states to redirect the internal policies of other states, the use
of such sanctions may violate international law. 4 In the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (the Act) the United States Congress imposed
economic sanctions on South Africa to exert influence on the South African
Government's apartheid5 policy toward the black majority in South Africa.
6
import trade with Libya, in retaliation for the December 27, 1985 terrorist attacks at the
Vienna and Rome airports that resulted in the deaths of five Americans. See Exec. Order No.
12543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875-76 (1986) (imposing economic sanctions against Libya); Nash,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 629, 629-31 (1986) (discussing
United States economic sanctions against Libya); see also infra note 6 and accompanying text
(noting authority for presidential imposition of economic sanctions against other states). The
United States imposed further economic sanctions against Libya on June 30, 1986 following
the bombing of a Berlin discotheque. See Nash, supra, at 988-91 (1986) (noting additional
sanctions imposed against Libya).
3. See HUFAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 1, at 29 (noting that some nations employ
sanctions to change domestic policies of target nation's government). In the last decade many
states have imposed economic sanctions on target states to change the internal policies of the
target state. HuFBA ER & SCHOTT, supra note 1, at 2. For example, in 1977 the United States
imposed economic sanctions against Paraquay, Guatemala, Argentina, Nicaragua, El Salvador,
and Brazil to induce those countries to ameliorate alleged human rights violations in those
states. Id. at 550-63, 568-82. In 1981 the United States imposed economic sanctions against
Poland to induce the Polish Government to lift martial law, free dissidents, and resume talks
with Solidarity. Id. at 696-711. In 1981 the European Community imposed economic sanctions
against Turkey to induce the Turkish Government to restore democracy in Turkey. Id. at 712-
16. In 1982 the United States and the Netherlands imposed economic sanctions against Suriname
to improve human rights in Suriname and to limit Suriname's alliance with Communist states.
Id. at 725-29. In 1982 South Africa imposed economic sanctions against Lesotho to induce
Lesotho to return refugees suspected of anti-South African activities to South Africa. Id. at
730-33.
4. See Lillich, Economic Coercion and the "New International Economic Order:" A
Second Look at Some First Impressions, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 233, 234 (1976) (noting that
economic coercion by states may violate international law); Note, Economic Sanctions Against
South Africa: Problems and Prospects for Enforcement of Human Rights Norms, 22 VA. J.
INT'L L. 345, 373-75 (1982) (noting that unilateral imposition of sanctions may violate
international law).
5. See 0. OzouR, ApA'tTHim: TaE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACmUL CHANGE IN SoUTH
AnucA 1-11 (1982) (discussing South African Government's Apartheid policy toward South
African blacks). Currently 24 million black people are living in South Africa under apartheid,
which is an Afrikaner word meaning separateness or apartness. See Minter, supra note 2, at
60 (describing demographics of South African society); Note, The Constitutionality of State
and Local Government's Response to Apartheid: Divestment Legislation, 13 FoiDwHM URB.
L. J. 763, 763 n. 1 (1985) (describing demographics of South Africa and defining apartheid).
About 1/2 of the South African black population lives in all-black "Bantustans," or homelands,
while the rest live in all-black townships near white cities where the blacks work. See Felton,
Capitol Hill Taking a New Look at Apartheid, 43 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 440, 440 (1985)
(detailing history and nature of apartheid). The 5 million member white minority, which has
dominated life in South Africa for the last 300 years, is composed of Afrikaner and predom-
inately white English-speaking people. See Minter, supra note 2, at 60 (describing demographics
of South Africa); Note, supra, at 763 n. 3 (describing history of white minority in South
Africa). The term Afrikaner describes a people of Dutch, French Hugueonot, and German
ancestry that settled in southern Africa in the 1600s. See Note, supra, at 763 n.3 (describing
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The Act raises serious questions concerning the legality of economic sanc-
tions under international law.
Afrikaner population). The Afrikaners are members of the white minority and form the
National Party that controls the South African Government. Id.
In 1985 the South African Parliament replaced the South African Government under the
Westminster system set up in 1910. DPAr~mzrrT OF FOREIGN AFAiRs, REPUBLIc oF SoUTr
AFRICA, SouTH AFRICA CONSMTMON AND SYSTEM OF GOvERNmENT 1 (1985). The new consti-
tutional system consists of three houses of government. Id. The House of Assembly is for
whites, the House of Representatives is for Coloureds, and the House of Delegates is for
Indians. Id. at 4. The constitutional system does not provide a House for South African
blacks, who mostly are split into ten national states that serve as a base for self-government.
Id. at 1. The South African Government has appointed a special cabinet committee to develop
a framework for including urban blacks into the South African constitutional system. Id.
Presently, blacks over the age of 18 may vote for members of the Legislative Assembly of the
nation state of which they are citizens. Id. at 29.
Blacks protested the new constitutional system that denied blacks significant political
representation. See Smith, Black Rage, White Fist, Tin, Aug. 5, 1985, at 24. Many blacks
and whites died in the ensuing violence. Id. The South African Government responded by
imposing a state of emergency on July 21, 1985, in 36 magisterial districts in South Africa
that gave the police and army wide discretion to quash the turmoil. See generally Recent
Developments, Economic Sanctions: United States Sanctions Against South Africa, 27 HAIv.
INr'L L. J. 235, 236 (1986) (noting state of emergency in South Africa); Rule, Apartheid Foes
Condemn New Cape Town Decree, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1985, at 23, col. 1 (on October 26,
1985, South African Government extended state of emergency to Cape Town and seven
surrounding districts following 30 violent deaths in preceding two-week period, while lifting
emergency rules in six other districts); Cowell, Emergency Power Granted To Police By South
Africa, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (prompted by months of widening violence in
which 500 people died, South Africa Government imposed state of emergency in 36 magisterial
districts).
6. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086-
116. In 1985 Congress drafted legislation concerning South African sanctions when President
Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12532 which imposed limited economic sanctions on South
Africa. See Exec. Order No. 12532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985) (Executive Order did not
include ban on krugerrands and failed to provide further sanctions should South Africa not
comply with Executive Order); Recent Developments, supra note 5, at 235 (noting that Exec.
Order No. 12532 was of symbolic importance, but failed to back anti-apartheid rhetoric with
substantive action). President Reagan issued the executive order under the authority vested in
him by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) and the National
Emergencies Act (NEA). See International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1702-1706 (Supp. 1985) (President may issue executive orders that prohibit imports
and exports with foreign nations); The National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651
(Supp. 1985) (President may issue executive orders curtailing imports and exports with other
nations). IEEPA requires that the President find that a foreign nation's domestic or foreign
policy constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the economy and foreign policy of
the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. 1985). President Reagan declared that the policy
of the Government of South Africa constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
foreign policy and economy of the United States and declared a national emergency in response
to that threat in the form of limited economic sanctions. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. 1985)
(President Reagan declares apartheid national emergency and unusual and extraordinary threat
to United States).
On June 18, 1986 the House passed H.R. 4868, which provided for a near total trade
embargo against South Africa. H.R. 4868, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). See Felton, House
May Buy Into Senate Bill Setting South African Sanctions, 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RP. 1982,
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On October 2, 1986 Congress passed the Act, which immediately pro-
hibited imports of South African iron, steel, sugar, and other agricultural
products and food.7 The Act also banned immediately exports to South
Africa of crude oil and petroleum products, as well as computers and
computer technology for the Government of South Africa.' Sanctions that
the Act phased in later included a ban on new investment in South Africa. 9
In addition, the Act prohibited imports from South Africa of uranium,
coal, and textiles ninety days after the Act's passage. 0 Another provision,
to commence ten days after the Act's enactment, provided that the President
direct the United States Secretary of Transportation to deny landing rights
to South African Airways in the United States and prohibit the takeoff and
landing in South Africa of aircraft owned or controlled by United States
nationals." The provision also directed the United States Secretary of State
to terminate a bilateral treaty of air travel between the United States and
South Africa.12 The Act further provided that if South Africa has not
1982 (1986) [hereinafter Felton House Buys] (discussing passage of H.R. 4868); Felton, Senate
Votes a Bill to Impose New Sanctions on South Africa, 44 CONG Q. WEEKLY REp. 1860, 1860
(1986) [hereinafter Felton Senate Votes] (same). On August 15, 1986 the Senate passed a
stronger version of H.R. 4868. H.R. 4868, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The House accepted
the Senate version and sent the Bill to President Reagan. H.R. 4868, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986). See Felton, Senate Votes, supra, at 1860 (discussing history of Act); Felton, House
Buys, supra, at 1982 (same). Stating that economic sanctions would hurt South African blacks
instead of help them, President Reagan vetoed H.R. 4868 on September 20, 1986. See Felton,
Hill Overrides Veto of South African Sanctions, 44 CoNa. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2338, 2338 (1986).
The House overrode the President's veto on September 29 and the Senate overrode the veto
on October 2, 1986. Id. When the Senate overrode President Reagan's veto on October 2, the
vote was the first override of a major foreign policy issue since Congress passed the War
Powers Resolution over President Nixon's veto in 1973. Id. at 2339.
7. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, §§ 320, 323, 319,
100 Stat. 1086, 1105-06. Section 319 of the Act prohibits imports of South African agricultural
products or articles suitable for human consumption. Id. § 319, at 1105. In 1985 the United
States imported $52 million in fruits and vegetables and $129 million in other agricultural
products from South Africa. Stine, Sanctions Levied Against South Africa, 44 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2270, 2271 (1986). In 1985 the United States imported $293.6 million of South
African iron and steel. Id.
8. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, §§ 321, 304, 100
Stat. 1086, 1105, 1099-1110. The Act's prohibition on exports of crude oil and petroleum
products does not apply to exports contracted before October 2, 1986. Id. at 1105.
9. Id. § 310(b), at 1102. The Act provided that the ban on new investment in South
Africa would take effect 45 days after the passage of the Act. Id. Under the Act, however, a
United States citizen may make new investments with firms owned by black South Africans.
Id.
10. Id. § 309, at 1102. In 1985 the United States imported $140 million in South African
uranium, $43.4 million in South African coal, and $55.1 million in South African textiles.
Stine, supra note 7, at 2271.
11. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 306(a)(2), (b)(3),
100 Stat. 1086, 1100-01. In 1985 95,000 passengers landed in the United States aboard South
Africa Airways. Stine, supra note 7, at 2271.
12. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 306(b)(1), 100
Stat. 1086, 1100; see Air Transport Services Agreement Between the Government of the United
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progressed by October 2, 1987 in ending apartheid and establishing a
nonracial democracy in South Africa, the President may impose additional
economic sanctions, including a ban on imports of South African diamonds
and strategic minerals.'
3
By means of the Act Congress sought an end to the apartheid system
of government in South Africa.14 Congress declared in the Act that the
United States policy is to use any effective means, such as economic,
political, and diplomatic measures, to remove apartheid from South Africa
and to assist the victims of apartheid.' 5 Congress stipulated that the Act's
economic sanctions will terminate if the Government of South Africa
complies with five demands.' 6 First, the Act demands the release of African
National Congress leader chief Nelson Mandela as well as the release of all
other persons persecuted for their political beliefs. 17 Second, the Act demands
that the South African Government repeal the present state of emergency
States of America and the Government of the Union of South Africa Relating to Air Services
Between Their Respective Territories, May 23, 1947, 61 Stat. 3057, T.I.A.S. No. 1639
[hereinafter Air Transport Agreement] (air transport agreement between United States and
South Africa).
13. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, §§ 501(c)(3), (c)(5),
100 Stat. 1086, 1108.
14. Id. §§ 103(a), (b)(2) & 201-212, at 1090-91, 1094-99; see supra note 5 and accom-
panying text (describing South African constitutional system of apartheid). The policy goals
of the Act are the immediate repeal of the present state of emergency in South Africa, and,
ultimately, an end to apartheid and the establishment of a nonracial and democratic form of
government in South Africa. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
440, § 101, 100 Stat. 1086, 1089.
The Act provides that United States policy is to induce the African National Congress
(ANC) to support an end to racial violence. Id. §102(a), at 1090. The goal of the ANC,
composed of members of racial groups, is to create a nonracial democracy in South Africa.
0. OzGuR, supra note 5, at 29. The South African Government banned the ANC in 1960. Id.
32, 41. The United States Congress also specifically condemned the practice of "necklacing,"
which is a form of torture imposed by blacks on other blacks thought to be government
informants. Id. § 312(c), at 1104. Necklacing occurs when black protesters place gasoline-filled
tires around the necks and legs of alleged informants and set the tires on fire. Felton, Senate
Votes, supra note 6, at 1861. In August 1986, 242 blacks died in South Africa. Id. Many of
the dead were victims of necklacing. Id. Many Americans view incidents such as necklacing
as crimes against humanity. Id.
15. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, §§ 103(a), (b)(2)
& 201-212, 100 Stat. 1086, 1090, 1094-99; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing
South African constitutional system of apartheid); supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting
United States policy goals behind passage of Act).
16. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, §§ 311(a)(1)-
311(a)(5), 1086, 1103; see infra note 22 and accompanying text (describing Act's alternative
termination procedures).
17. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 311(a)(1), 100
Stat. 1086, 1103; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing ANC). Nelson Mandela,
a lawyer and an ANC leader and in jail since 1962, has been serving a life sentence on the
Robben Island prison since 1964. 0. OzGtU, supra note 5, at 30. Although the South African
Government has imprisoned many political malcontents, Nelson Mandela has come to symbolize
the movement for a nonracial democracy. Id.
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in South Africa.' Third, the Act requires South Africa to permit the
formation of democratic parties and allow members of all races to participate
in the political process in South Africa. 19 Fourth, the Act demands that
South Africa repeal all South African acts and measures that limit where
nonwhites may live and work.20 Last, the Act requires that the Government
of South Africa agree to enter into good faith negotiations with represen-
tatives of the black majority in South Africa.2' Alternatively, the Act
authorizes the President of the United States to terminate the economic
sanctions of the Act if the President reports to Congress that the South
African Government has fulfilled the Act's purposes and policy goals.
22
Because the United States implemented the Act to change the internal
policies of South Africa, the use of economic sanctions by the United States
may be illegal under international law. 23 Although all states have the
sovereign right to regulate their foreign trade with other states, economic
conduct that undermines the sovereign authority of a target state may violate
international law.24 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) settles inter-
18. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 311(a)(2), 100
Stat. 1086, 1103; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing present state of emergency
in South Africa).
19. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 311(a)(3), 100
Stat. 1086, 1103; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing present form of
government in South Africa).
20. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 311(a)(4), 100
Stat. 1086, 1103.
21. Id. § 311(a)(5) at 1103.
22. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 311(b), 100 Stat.
1086, 1103. Under §§ 501(c), 504(b), and 301-323 of the Act the President of the United States
can suspend or modify the sanctions 30 days after reporting to Congress that the Government
of South Africa has achieved three measures. Id. § 311, at 1103. The first measure is the
release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. Id. §311 (b)(l), at 1103; see supra
notes 14 & 17 and accompanying text (discussing ANC, Mandela and other political prisoners).
The second measure is the accomplishment by the South African Government of three of the
following four actions: 1) the repeal of the present state of emergency; 2) the legalization of
democratic political parties available to all races; 3) the repeal of acts that restrict where
nonwhites live and work; and 4) the agreement to enter into good faith negotiations with
black leaders. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 311(b)(2),
100 Stat. 1086, 1103. The third measure is presidential determination that the Government of
South Africa has made substantial progress toward dismantling apartheid. Id. § 311(b)(3), at
1103. Within the 30-day period Congress may pass a joint resolution under the Act not to
terminate the sanctions suggested by the President, despite South Africa's compliance with the
presidential termination measures. Id. §§ 311(b), 602, at 1103, 1112-13.
The Act also authorizes the President of the United States to terminate the sanctions
banning imports from South Africa of coal or strategic and critical material. Id. § 502(a), at
1109. If the President finds that nonimportation of these materials from South Africa would
force the United States to import the strategic materials from communist countries to levels
above the average annual imports from the communist countries between 1981 to 1985, then
the President can lift the particular sanction or sanctions. Id. § 502(b), at 1109.
23. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text (describing how Act may change
internal structure of South African society).
24. See C. EAGLETON, INTERNATiOtNAL GovE RNmET 86-87 (3d ed. 1957) (states are free
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national disputes, such as alleged infringements of sovereign authority, that
contestant states submit to the ICJ's jurisdiction. 25 Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) identifies the traditional
sources of international law used by the ICJ to determine the legality of a
state's international conduct. 26 Under article 38 of the ICJ Statute the ICJ
is to apply international conventions and treaties that establish rules expressly
recognized by the disputants, international custom as defined by the accepted
practice of states, general principles of international law recognized by
civilized nations, and judicial decisions and the scholarship of internationally
respected publicists. 27 The sources of international law in article 38 of the
ICJ Statute constitute the commonly accepted sources used to evaluate
not to trade with other states); E. VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 39 (Chitty ed.1883) (states are
free to trade with any other nation); see also Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J.
INT'L L. & EcoN. 187, 192 (1974) (noting right of nations to regulate their trade as long as
regulation is not motivated to undermine target state's sovereignty); Note, The Legitimacy of
the United States Embargo of Uganda, 13 J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 651, 656-57 (1979)(noting
that embargo against Uganda in response to human rights violations may constitute properly
motivated breach of customary international law); Note, supra note 4, at 353 (noting that test
of legality of use of economic force rests on propriety of motivation and not necessarily on
impact of result); infra note 108 and accompanying text (noting that intervention violates
international law if directed against target's sovereignty).
25. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No.
993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. Annexed to the Charter of the United Nations, the ICJ Statute
prescribes rules of operation for the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Id. In cases before
the ICJ, only states may be parties. Id. at art. 34(1). The jurisdiction of the ICJ is dependent
on the consent of a state to appear, and that consent may take several forms. Id. at art. 36.
Parties to a dispute specifically may refer the dispute to the ICJ's jurisdiction or they may
confer jurisdiction to the ICJ by treaty. Id. at art. 36(1). Alternatively, states that are parties
to the ICJ Statute may accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ by prior declaration. Id.
at art. 36(2). A state that has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ by declaration
may be brought before the ICJ only by other states that that have made similar declarations.
Id. If the claimant state has attached reservations to its declaration, the defendant state may
use the reservation before the ICJ. Id. Judgements of the ICJ in contentious cases are binding
upon the parties, but the United Nations Charter allows wide discretion to the Security Council
to enforce the judgement. See U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2 (if party fails to follow judgment
rendered by ICJ, recourse is to Security Council, which determines appropriate measures).
When states accept the ICJ's jurisdiction in a dispute, they in effect accept the ICJ's judgement
as well. See M. AxzURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 209 (5th ed.
1984) (acceptance by state of ICJ's authority to decide reflects state's willingness to abide by
ICJ's judgement). Both the United States and South Africa are ipso facto parties to the ICJ
Statute. U.N. CHARTER art. 93.
26. See ICJ Statute, supra note 25, at art. 38(1) (noting that ICJ applies article 38 of
Statute to settle disputes between states).
27. See ICJ Statute, supra note 25, at art. 38(1) (enumerating traditional sources of
international law). A "convention" is the same as a treaty for purposes of identifying sources
of international law. See M. AXEtrsT, supra note 25, at 23-24 (stating that convention is
treaty in international law). A treaty is an understanding between two or more states or
international organizations that establishes a binding agreement between the parties subject to
international law. See A. McNAm, LAW OF Ta.mATrs 3-4 (1961) (analyzing treaties in trans-
national relations).
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potential violations of international law.? Of the sources of international
law in article 38, treaties and international custom are the fundamental
sources used to determine the legality of a state's conduct toward another
state.29 A determination of the legal status of the United States economic
sanctions against South Africa, therefore, should consider treaties signed by
the parties as well as customary international law."
The Charter of the United Nations (Charter) exemplifies international
law created by treaty." Because the United States and South Africa have
signed the Charter, the Charter is binding on both parties.32 Several articles
of the Charter are applicable to the question of whether the use of economic
sanctions by one member state to change the domestic policies of another
member state violates international law. 33 Article 2(4) of the Charter pro-
scribes the threat or use of force by one member state against any other
member state in a manner that violates the sovereign authority of that state
or contravenes the purposes of the United Nations. 34 The question of whether
28. See ICJ Statute, supra note 25, at art. 38. See M. AxtlsuRsT, supra note 25, at 23
(article 38 of ICJ Statute enumerates generally accepted sources of international law); C.
PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-27 (1965) (discussing article
38 of ICJ Statute and sources of international law); H. STEINER & D. VAors, TRANSNATIONAL
LEoAL PROBLEMS 249 (2d ed. 1976) (same).
29. See L. OPPENnEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 19 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955) (treaties
and custom are two principal sources of international law); Bowett, International Law and
Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 245, 245-49 (1976) (discussing use of treaties and
custom to analyze economic coercion under international law).
30. See infra notes 32, 71 & 88 and accompanying text (discussing treaties signed by
United States and South Africa); infra notes 101, 113-26 and accompanying text (discussing
customary international law and economic sanctions).
31. U.N. CHARTER, June 6, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993; L. OPPENFIIM, supra
note 29, at § 18. Treaties may change customary rules of international law as between the
parties. Id; see R. HiGiNs, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE PoLmcAL
ORGANS OF THE UNTED NATIONS (1963) (Charter is declaratory of customary international
law); Note, supra note 24, at 660 (Charter reflects or declares customary international law);
Comment, U.S. Trade Sanctions Against Uganda: Legality Under International Law, 11 L. &
POL'Y Irr'L Bus., 1149, 1174-75 (Charter represents foremost example of international law
created by treaty).
32. U.N. CHARITER, June 6, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. A treaty is binding upon
the treaty's signatories. L. OPPENHam, supra note 29, at § 519. See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969)(treaties do not create
obligations or rights for third state without its consent) reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L. L. 875
(1969).
33. See infra notes 34-50 and accompanying text (discussing economic sanctions and
article 2(4) of Charter); infra notes 52-70 and accompanying text (discussing economic sanctions
and articles 2(3), 33, 55, and preamble of Charter).
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Article I of the Charter expresses the purposes of
the United Nations. Id. at art. 1. The purposes of the United Nations are to maintain
international peace and security, promote international co-operation in solving international
problems, and foster friendly relations among nations. Id. To further the development of
friendly international relations, the Charter recognizes the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples. Id. at art. 1(2). Another purpose of the United Nations is to achieve
international cooperation in solving international problems of a humanitarian character and
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economic coercion by one member state against another member state
constitutes a threat or use of force under article 2(4) has created much
debate.s The "narrow" reading, yet majority interpretation, of article 2(4)
suggests that article 2(4) does not forbid the use of economic sanctions by
one member state against another member state because article 2(4) "force"
only includes armed force.3 6 Failed attempts to construe article 2(4) to
include economic coercion support the narrow interpretation of article 2(4).
37
One failed attempt occurred when the San Francisco Conference writing the
Charter voted to defeat a proposal that the prohibitions in article 2(4)
include economic measures. 31 Under the narrow interpretation of article
in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without racial distinctions.
Id. at art. 1, para. 3; see infra note 40 and accompanying text (noting United Nations purposes
incorporate respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms).
35. See infra notes 34-50 and accompanying text (discussing economic sanctions and
article 2(4)). Compare Lillich, supra note 4, at 235-36 (that article 2(4) "force" does not
include economic measures is conventional wisdom); and Bowett, supra note 29, at 245 (article
2(4) should not include economic coercion); with J. Fonteyne, The Customary International
Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Interventions: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter,
17 Comp. JtuRm. REV. 27, 58-59, 62 (1980) (classic view of article 2(4) "force" encompasses
entire range of force, including economic and polical coercion); and Akehurst, Humanitarian
Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORM POITICS 95, 104-06 (Bull ed. 1984) (article 2(4)
imposes total ban on use of force, including economic and political measures).
36. See Lillich, supra note 4, at 235-36 (article 2(4) "force" does not include economic
measures); see also infra notes 46-50 (discussing narrow view of article 2(4)). Cf. J. SToN,
AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 54, 58-60, 66-68, 111 (1958)(Charter definition of aggression,
as analogy to force, is limited to armed aggression).
37. See 21 U.N. GAOR Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (25th mtg.) at 12, para. 23, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.125/SR.25 (1966)(hereinafter Special Committee Concerning Friendly Relations)(noting
that United Arab Republic delegate unsuccessfully argued that article 2(4) should include
economic and political pressure as an illegal use of force); Report of the Special Committee
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among
States, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp.(No. 18) at 120, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970)(hereinafter Report
Concerning Friendly Relations)(noting article 2(4) use of force concerns threat or use of armed,
or physical, force only); Bowett, supra note 29, at 245 (article 2(4) should not include economic
coercion); Lillich, supra note 4, at 235 (noting failed attempts to include economic measures
under article 2(4)'s prohibition of force); infra note 38 and accompanying text (noting failed
attempt at San Francisco Conference to construe article 2(4) of Charter as including economic
coercion). Cf. J. SToN, supra note 36, at 54, 58-60, 66-68, 111 (1958) (stating that General
Assembly's definition of aggression analogous to definition of aggression in Charter and is
limited to armed aggression); Lillich, supra note 4, at 234-236 (same).
The United Nations condemned economic coercion in the Special Committee Concerning
Friendly Relations, but only in the context of the duty of nonintervention under customary
international law, rather than in the context of the prohibition against the use of force located
in article 2(4). See Special Committee Concerning Friendly Relations, supra, at 16, para. 39
(statement of Mr. Sinclair, delegate of the United Kingdom); Lillich, supra note 4, at 236-37
(noting statement of United Kingdom delegate); infra note 108 and accompanying text (noting
duty of nonintervention in customary international law).
38. See Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331, 334-35 (1945) (noting failure at San
Francisco Conference to include economic measures in article 2(4)). In 1945 a Brazilian delegate
to the San Francisco Conference that authored the Charter proposed that the prohibitions in
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2(4), therefore, the Act does not violate article 2(4) because the Act does
not include armed force. 39 Moreover, the Act arguably supports the purposes
of the United Nations. Because one of the four purposes of the United
Nations is to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms without
racial distinctions, and because the Act has similar goals, the United Nations
may even condone the United States sanctions. 40
article 2(4) include economic measures, but the Conference defeated the Brazilian proposal 26
to 2. Id; see Lillich, supra note 4, at 234-36 (noting defeat of measure to include economic
measures in article 2(4) at San Francisco Conference); Comment, supra note 31, at 1181
(noting failure of Charter framers to include economic measures in article 2(4)).
39. U.N. CHARTER at art. 2 para. 4; see supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting
that Act implementation does not require resort to armed force).
40. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (purpose of United Nations is to solve international
humanitarian problems and to promote international respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms without distinction regarding race); supra note 14 and accompanying text (purpose
of Act is to promote establishment of nonracial and democratic form of government for South
Africa). In a recent editorial comment, a legal adviser to the Government of Baharian expressed
his personal views on the relation between force in article 2(4) of the Charter and the purposes
of the United Nations. Nawaz, "Editorial Comment: What Limits on the Use of Force? Can
Force Be Used to Depose An Oppressive Government?," 24 INDIAN J. INT'L L 406 (1984).
The author noted that textually article 2(4) not only prohibits the threat or use of force by
one member state against the territorial integrity or political independenceof another member
state, but also prescribes the threat or use of force that is contrary to the purposes of the
United Nations. Id. at 408. Article 1 of the U.N. Charter States that the purposes of the
United Nations are to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, to promote human rights and to act as a center for international harmony in the
attainment of these purposes. Nawaz, supra at 408; U.N. CHARR art. 1. Presumably state
action that does not include armed force and that is not contrary to the purposes of the
United Nations is permissible.
Three articles of the Charter link racial nondiscrimination with respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms. U.N. CARTER at art. 1, para. 3, art. 62, para. 2, & art. 76.
para. c. A purpose of the United Nations is to achieve international cooperation in solving
international problems of a humanitarian character and in promoting respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms. Id. at art. 1, para. 3. Article 62 of the Charter empowers the
United Nations Economic and Social Council, elected by the United Nations General Assembly,
to promote respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Id. at art.
62, para. 2. Article 76 provides that a basic principle of the International Trusteeship System
of the United Nations is to to encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
regardless of race. Id. at art. 76, para. c. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
therefore, are an integral part of the Charter. See 0. Ozcu, supra note 5, at 4-6 (racial
nondiscrimination including enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms is keystone
of Charter). Because Article 2 of the Charter provides that all member states must fulfill
Charter obligations in good faith, South Africa is bound by the Charter to respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms. See U.N. CHARTER at art. 2, para. 2 (stating that Members
of United Nations shall fulfill in good faith obligations under the Charter).
In addition to the Charter, United Nations human rights instruments support the principle
of racial nondiscrimination. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declara-
tion), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, promotes the principle of racial
nondiscrimination. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, 3 U.N.
GAOR A/810, (1948)[hereinafter Universal Declaration](United Nations opposes racial discrim-
ination); 0. OzouR, supra note 5, at 6 (irrespective of its binding force, Universal Declaration
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Contrary to the majority interpretation, the "broad" reading or minority
interpretation of article 2(4) is that article 2(4) force refers to all forms of
intervention, including economic coercion, by one member state into the
affairs of another member state. 41 The Charter prescribes that only United
is authoritative interpretation of Charter provisions on human rights and fundamental free-
doms). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), gave legal force to the
Universal Declaration. See id. at 7 (stating that ICESCR and ICCPR give legal force to
Universal Declaration). G.A. Res. 2200 A, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966). Article 2 of both covenants prohibit racial discrimination. See 0. OzoUR, supra note
5, at 7-8 (discussing both covenants).
The United Nations also has adopted the International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (Crime of Apartheid Convention), which establishes
international criminal responsibility for individuals and members or representatives of organ-
izations, institutions, and states who commit the crime of apartheid. International Convention
on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 26 U.N. GAOR (1406th plen.
mtg.) U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1871 (1971). Article I of the Crime of Apartheid Convention
declares that apartheid is a crime against humanity, that apartheid violates the purposes and
principles of the Charter, and that apartheid constitutes a serious threat to international peace
and security. Id. at art. 1; see 0. OzGuR, supra note 5, at 9-11 (discussing Crime of Apartheid
Convention).
Even though the Charter and United Nations human rights instruments support the
principle of racial nondiscrimination, article 2(7) of the Charter limits the competence of the
United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
a member state. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. Thus, an apparent disjunction exists between
the jurisdiction of the United Nations and the domestic jurisdiction of states. See 0. OzGUR,
supra note 5, at 13-21 (noting ambiguity of Charter regarding overlap of United Nations and
domestic jurisdiction of Member states concerning human rights violations). The Charter
excludes, however, violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms from domestic
jurisdiction if the violations are a threat to international peace and the violations obstruct the
application of the provisions of the Charter. U.N. CHARTER at art. 2, para. 7; 0. OzGtr,
supra note 5, at 18. At the very least, gross or consistent patterns of human rights violations
are within the concurrent jurisdiction of both the United Nations and the state where the
violations occur. 0. OZGUR, supra note 5,
at 20. Furthermore, since the Charter contains a pledge to encourage respect for human rights,
the Charter implies an obligation of member states not to undermine human rights in their
own state. See J.L. BRmRLY, THE LAw OF NATiONS 293 (6th ed. 1963) (analyzing Charter's
obligation of states not to undermine human rights, which South Africa's apartheid policy
appears to contravene); 0. OZGUR, supra note 5, at 20 (same).
In addition to the United Nations theoretical support for the imposition of economic
sanctions by one state acting alone to rectify human rights transgressions, the United Nations
has imposed its own sanctions against South Africa's policy of apartheid. 0. OZGUR, supra
note 5, at 77.
41. See Fonteyne, supra note 35, at 62-76 (noting that article 2(4) force encompasses
broad range of situations). The exponents of the broad interpretation of article 2(4) of the
Charter maintain that article 2(4) forbids all forms of intervention by one member state into
the internal affairs of another member state. See Akehurst, supra note 35 at 104-05 (Bull ed.
1984) (stating that all forms of intervention are illegal and rejecting applicability of narrow
interpretation of article 2(4)); Franck & Rodiey, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian
Intervention By Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L. L. 275, 299-302 (1973) (same). One advocate
of a broad interpretation of article 2(4) force states that article 2(4) concerns a broad range
of situations, that article 2(4) is inclusive, and that article 2(4) forbids all forms of intervention,
1987] 1425
1426 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Nations Security Council42 (Security Council) approval or legitimate claims
of self-defense permit a member state to use "force" against another
member state.43 Under the broad interpretation of article 2(4), therefore, a
state cannot use economic coercion against another state unless the Security
Council approves or unless the use of economic coercion constitutes a
legitimate exercise of self-defense. 44 Thus, under the broad interpretation of
article 2(4), the United States sanctions against South Africa may constitute
a use of force that violates article 2(4) of the Charter.
4
including economic sanctions. Fonteyne, supra note 35, at 28 n. 4, 62, 64 & 66. If article 2(4)
does forbid economic sanctions, then the use of economic sanctions for any purpose violates
the Charter. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that broad interpretation of
article 2(4) forbids economic sanctions used to effect humanitarian goals).
42. U.N. CHARTER Chapter V. The Security Council consists of fifteen Members of the
United Nations. Id. at art. 23, para. 1. China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and the United States are permanent members of the Security Council. Id. The General
Assembly elects the remaining ten members of the Security Council to two year terms. Id. at
art. 23, para. 2. The Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. Id. at art. 24, para. I.
43. U.N. CHARTER arts. 42, 51. A member state of the United Nations legitimately may
use force against another Member state if the Security Council of the United Nations (Security
Council) has determined that other measures are or would prove to be inadequate. Id. at art.
42. Under article 39 of the Charter the Security Council may determine whether a threat to
international peace or an act of aggression exists that warrants measures, short of armed force,
to restore international peace and security. Id. at art 39. The Security Council then is free to
impose economic sanctions as a measure to thwart threats to international peace and security.
Id. If peaceful measures prove inadequate to restore international peace, the Security Council,
under article 42, may decide that armed force is necessary. Id. at art. 42. Also, a member
state legitimately may use armed force in self-defense in response to armed force. Id. at art.
51. Because the Charter recognizes the sovereignty of each state and the inviolability of each
state's internal affairs, the two exceptions to the use of force by one member state against
another member state arise either as a result of a Security Council determination that an
aggressor state has abused the sovereignty of a target state or that a state needs to defend its
own sovereignty with an armed response. See U.N. CHARTER at art. 2, para. 1 (United Nations
based on principle of sovereign equality of all Members); id. art. 2, para. 7 (United Nations
may not intervene in matters essentially within domestic jurisdiction of any state, except
pursuant to Security Council recommendation); id. at art. 39 (Security Council shall determine
existence of any threat to peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations to
maintain or restore international peace and security); id. at art. 41 (Security Council shall
decide what measures short of armed force to employ to restore international peace and
security); id. at art. 42 (Security Council shall decide if armed force is necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security); id. at art. 51 (Member states have an inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack); infra, note III (defining
sovereignty).
44. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (under broad interpretation of article 2(4),
article 2(4) of Charter forbids use of any force by one member state against another member
state, including use of economic measures).
45. See Akehurst, supra note 35, at 104-06 (force under article 2(4) includes economic
and political measures). Proponents of the broad interpretation of article 2(4) suggest that
accelerated world economic interdependence lends credence to the inclusion of economic
measures under article 2(4) because a state's control over its internal policies may become
vulnerable to another state's foreign economic policy. See Comment, supra note 31, at 1182-
87 (broad view of article 2(4) notes that increasing world economic interdependence necessitates
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Although lacking international censensus, the majority view that force
refers to only armed force and not economic and political pressure is most
consistent with the goal of article 2(4).4 The goal of article 2(4) is the
protection of a state's sovereignty. 47 Armed force by one state against
rethinking definition of "force" in article 2(4)). As a result of increasing world economic
interdependence, economic force has the potential to create undesirable consequences such as
economic instability, threat to national security or widespread loss of life in a target state. Id.
Proponents of the broad view argue, therefore, that accelerated international economic inter-
dependence might support the inclusion under article 2(4) of economic measures because
economic force might be as devastating to a target nation as armed force. Id. Proponents of
the broad view assert, furthermore, that article 2(4) forbids any use of force that undermines
the territorial integrity or political independence of a target state. Id.; Akehurst, supra note
35, at 104-06. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. See supra notes 34 & 40 and accompanying text
(noting purposes of the United Nations); infra note 111 and accompanying text (noting
definition of sovereignty). Proponents of the broad interpretation of article 2(4) continue that
if economic force is used in a manner that undermines a nation's territorial integrity or
political independence, then perhaps economic force should be subject to the strictures of
article 2(4). Akehurst, supra note 35, at 105; Comment, supra note 31, at 1184-86. Under the
broad interpretation of article 2(4) the United States sanctions imposed against South Africa,
therefore, violate article 2(4) because the United States use of the sanctions unduly will
influence the South African Government's determination of the form of government for South
Africa. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting that article 2(4) of the Charter
proscribes use of force by one member state that violates sovereign authority of another
member state); infra note 111 and accompanying text (noting definition of sovereignty); supra
note 14 and accompanying text (noting that policy goal of Act is to establish a nonracial and
democratic form of government in South Africa).
A further aspect of increasing world economic interdependence is the eroding of state
sovereignty and nonintervention as reliable principles supporting international law and inter-
national interaction among nations. See C. THOMAS, NEW STATES, SOVEREIGNTY AND NONIN-
TERvENTION 5-6 (1985) (questioning principles of sovereignty and nonintervention as sound
bases of international legal system). In theory, recognition of a state's sovereignty entails an
understanding of the inviolability of a sovereign state's borders from outside influence. See
supra note 111 and accompanying text (analyzing principle of sovereignty). In practice, however,
state borders increasingly are vulnerable to foreign leverage and persuasion. C. THOMAS, supra,
at 1-9. Scientific and technological advances concerning communications, international trade,
and sophisticated military weapons continue to make state borders more accessible to external
influences. Id. at 5-6. Furthermore, state borders appear freely susceptible to international
terrorism. Id. at 4-6. The division between sovereignty in theory and practice may produce
confusion about permissible transnational conduct. Id. The confusion may cripple trust in the
future relationship between states based on the principle of sovereignty. Thus, under the broad
interpretation of article 2(4), the question concerning the applicability of economic sanctions
to article 2(4) rests on a determination of whether the use of economic sanctions in a particular
episode constitutes a forbidden use of force. One method to determine whether economic
sanctions constitutes a forbidden use of force might be for the Security Council to determine
the scope of article 2(4) force on an ad hoc basis. In that event, the same sanctions applied
against a small nation may violate article 2(4) because smaller nations may be unable to
withstand outside economic pressure that would not violate article 2(4) when applied against
a larger, more economically independent state.
46. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 52(a), at 154 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952)
(expression "force" in article 2(4) refers to armed force and not to economic or political
pressure).
47. See U.N. CHRTER at art. 2, para. 1 (United Nations based on principle of sovereign
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another state nearly always violates the territorial integrity and sovereign
authority of the target state.4 Economic force, however, may or may not
violate the target state's sovereignty.4 9 The narrow interpretation, therefore,
limiting the threat or use of force proscribed by article 2(4) to include only
armed force, is the more correct interpretation of article 2(4). Under the
narrow interpretation of article 2(4) the Act does not violate article 2(4) of
the Charter. 50
In addition to article 2(4) of the Charter, other provisions of the Charter
may be relevant in examining the United States sanctions against South
Africa. 5' Article 2(3) requires the members of the United Nations to use
peaceful means to settle disputes that are likely to endanger international
peace and security. 52 No international consensus has emerged, however,
equality of all Members); art. 2, para. 4 (Members shall refrain from use of force directed
against territorial integrity or political independence of any state); L. OPPENHEIM, supra note
46, § 52(a), at 154 (territorial integrity and political independence in article 2(4) refer to
territorial inviolability); infra note Ill and accompanying text (defining sovereignty).
48. See L. Oppnmr im, supra note 46, § 52(a) at 154 (armed force violates territorial
integrity and sovereign authority of target state, except in fulfillment of obligations to give
effect to Charter or in pursuance of self-defense). Except in rare instances, the use of armed
force violates article 2(4) under both the narrow and broad interpretations. See supra note 36
and accompanying text (noting narrow interpretation of article 2(4) forbids use of armed force
by one Member state against another Member state); supra note 41 and accompanying text
(noting broad interpretation of article 2(4) of Charter forbids use of armed force by one
Member state against another Member state); infra note 108 and accompanying text (noting
duty of states under customary international law not to use armed force to intervene in
sovereign affairs of other states). An example of when armed force does not violate the
prohibition against the use of force in article 2(4) occurs when the force is in self-defense or
if the sovereign authority of the state where the force is used requested the force. See U.N.
CHARTER at art. 51 (armed force permitted in self-defense only in response to armed attack);
L. OPPE lmim supra note 29, at §134 (noting that interference at request of target state does
not violate international law); infra note 108 and accompanying text (describing illegality of
intervention).
49. See Akehurst, supra note 35, at 106 (stating article 2(4) forbids use of economic
measures by one Member state against another Member state). But see Lillich, supra note 4,
at 234-36 (noting defeat of proposal to include economic measures in article 2(4) at San
Francisco conference). Because the Charter framers specifically failed to include economic
measures in article 2(4), the framers failed to define whether the use of economic sanctions
might contravene article 2(4). See Lillich, supra note 4, at 234-35 (noting failure at San
Francisco conference to include economic measures in article 2(4)). In the final analysis, then,
economic measures in conjunction with armed aggression surely would violate article 2(4). To
conclude that economic sanctions alone might constitute a contravention of article 2(4) use of
force is to ignore the general principle that states have the right to regulate their foreign trade
as a sovereign right. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting general principle that
states have right to regulate their foreign trade as a sovereign right). Thus, to hold the view
that article 2(4) does include a prohibition against the use of economic force necessitates a
fine line drawing of when economic measures violate article 2(4) and when economic measures
are a legitimate exercise of a nation's right to regulate its own foreign trade.
50. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (discussing narow interpretation of
article 2(4)).
51. See infra notes 52-70 and accompanying text (noting other provisions of Charter in
examining legality of United States economic sanctions against South Africa).
52. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
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regarding what constitutes a dispute under article 2(3). The Permanent
Court of International Justice has defined a dispute as a legal conflict or
disagreement. 53 In addition, one commentator has defined a dispute as a
disagreement or controversy in the form of claims, refusals, counterclaims,
or accusations. 54 The events leading up to the Act's passage satisfies either
definition because the United States Congress, disagreeing with South Af-
rica's apartheid system, has accused the South African Government of
refusing to grant South African blacks adequate legal rights.15 For the
53. The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 11,
quoted in Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo and United States Pressure Against Chile: Economic
and Political Coercion and the Charter of the United Nations, 7 CASE W. J. INT'L. L. 3, 31
(1974). The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), came into force in 1920. M.
AKEHuRST, supra note 25 , at 205. The League of Nations elected the judges to the PCIJ. Id.
The PCIJ, dissolved in 1946 at the same time as the League of Nations, is similar to its
successor, the ICJ. Id.
In 1914, the PCIJ discussed whether a dispute existed between Greece and Britain. The
alleged dispute arose when a Greek subject, M. Mavrommatis, was on the point of obtaining
from competent Ottoman authorities contracted concessions. See M.O. HuDSON, PERM.NENT
COURT OF INTERNATiONAL JusTicE 100 (1925)(discussing Mavrommatis case). M. Mavrommatis
complained to the PCIJ that the Ottoman Government, and subsequently the British Govern-
ment, wrongly refused to recognize the contracts. Id. M. Mavrommatis sought reparations.
Id. The Greek Government intervened on Mavrommatis' behalf asserting a right to ensure
respect for the rules of international law in the person of its subjects. Id. at 102. Thus, the
first question for the PCIJ was whether a dispute existed between the two states. Id. The
PCIJ decided that a dispute did exist. Id.
54. See Brosche, supra note 53, at 31 (noting dispute entails disagreement or controversy
in form of claims met by refusals, counterclaims, accusations, and denials). The definition
that a dispute is a disagreement or controversy in the form of claims, refusals, counterclaims,
and accusations has supported the argument that the Arab states' oil embargo against the
United States amounted to some sort of counterclaim and, therefore, a dispute concerning
appropriate Isreali policy existed between the Arab states and the United States. Id. The same
definition, however, does not support one state's efforts to change the political and economic
situation of another state, unless the effort at change is a matter of "international concern".
Brosche, supra note 53, at 31. Because the Security Council specifically has labelled apartheid
a matter of international concern, the United States sanctions against South Africa constitute
a dispute subject to article 2(3). See S.C. Res. 417, 32 U.N. SCOR (2045th mtg.) at 4-5, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/33 (1977) (stating that policies of South African Government will lead to serious
international repercussions); S.C. Res. 392, 31 U.N. SCOR (1930th mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/32 (1976) (stating that apartheid is crime against conscience and dignity of mankind
and seriously disturbs international peace and security); S.C. Res. 311, 27 U.N. SCOR (1639th
mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28 (1972) (stating that apartheid seriously disturbs international
peace and security).
55. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (defining dispute as legal conflict or
disagreement between nations). The events leading up to the Act's passage constitute a legal
conflict or disagreement because the United States proclaimed a humanitarian impetus behind
the Act's sanctions occasioned by the South African Government's denial of human rights for
black South African citizens. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text (describing
humanitarian intervention); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text (defining dispute as
disagreement or controversy between nations in form of accusations). The events leading up
to the Act's passage also constitute a dispute because by passing the Act, the United States
tacitly has accused the South African Government of not granting black South Africans
adequate legal rights. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (purpose of Act is to promote
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purpose of article 2(3), therefore, a dispute exists between the United States
and South Africa concerning the South African Government's policy of
apartheid.
Concerning disputes that are likely to endanger international peace and
security, member states of the United Nations must seek solutions by any
of the peaceful means enumerated in article 33 of the Charter.5 6 Article 33
provides that to settle disputes states should negotiate, mediate, resort to
third party adjudication, or otherwise mutually agree upon appropriate
forms of redress.5 7 The United States has attempted to settle the dispute
with South Africa over apartheid by means of President Reagan's policy of
"constructive engagement." 5 8 Constructive engagement, a policy designed
to bring diplomatic pressure against the Government of South Africa to
negotiate with South African blacks concerning racial reforms in South
Africa and to better interstate relations between the states of Southern
Africa, is thus a form of negotiation under article 33.19 Failing to effect an
establishment of nonracial and democratic form of government for all South Africans). Not
only does a dispute exist under the first definition, but the United Nations has stated that
apartheid endangers international peace and security. See supra note 54 and accompanying
text (noting United Nations declaration that apartheid seriously disturbs international peace);
supra note 40 and accompanying text (apartheid endangers international peace and security
and is crime against humanity).
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 33. To qualify as a dispute under article 33 an interaction between
states must endanger international peace and security. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Felton, 'Less Than Brilliant' Administrative Role Contributed to Momentum For
Sanctions, 44 CoNo. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2340, 2340 (1986)[hereinafter Felton, Administrative
Role](detailing President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement designed to ameliorate
effects of apartheid in South Africa). Before late 1984, President Reagan pursued a passive
policy toward apartheid in South Africa and allowed the United States State Department's
Africa bureau, headed by assistant Secretary Chester Crocker, to formulate United States
policy toward South Africa. Id. In 1981 Crocker drafted, with Presidential approval, a policy
named "constructive engagement." Id. The core of Crocker's policy comprised friendly
persuasion toward racial reform in South Africa as well as toward settlement of disputes
between the states of Southern Africa. Id. Anti-apartheid protesters in the United States felt
that constructive engagement lacked sufficient persuasive power and began to picket the South
African Embassy in Washington. Id. The House quickly passed a sanctions bill that went to
a House-Senate conference on July 31, 1985. Id. Shortly thereafter, on September 9, 1985,
President Reagan issued an executive order imposing many of the sanctions in the House Bill.
Id. Pleased with the Presidential initiative, a Republican filibuster in the Senate effectively
terminated the bill in conference. Id. Continued racial violence in South Africa, however, led
to a rejuvenated sanctions movement in Congress and the House passed a new bill in June,
1986. Id; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (detailing history of Act).
59. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing constructive engagement).
Negotiation is interaction between two or more states as initiated and directed to effect an
understanding between them or to settle a dispute. L. OPPENHOM, supra note 29, § 477, at
867 (defiming concept of negotiation). The purpose of negotiation may be to exchange views
on a particular subject, to arrange a possible future course of action, or to settle a dispute.
Id. at § 479, at 868 (discussing various purposes of negotiations). The form of negotiations
may be spoken or through written communication. Id. §§ 481-482, at 868 (noting forms of
negotiation). Constructive engagement is, thus, a spoken form of negotiation initiated and
directed to settle the dispute between South Africa and the United States. See supra notes 51-
55 and accompanying text (discussing current dispute between United States and South Africa.)
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end to apartheid through this policy of negotiation, the United States
imposed economic sanctions against South Africa.6 Although article 33
does not specifically address economic sanctions, 61 the United States still
has complied with articles 2(3) and 33 of the Charter by attempting first to
resolve its dispute with South Africa by the peaceful method of constructive
engagement.
62
In addition to complying with the requirements of articles 2(3) and 33,
the Act is consistent with important goals of the Charter.6 For example,
the goals of articles 2(3) and 33 include the maintenance of international
peace and security.64 In addition, to further the general goal of international
peace and security both the preamble and article 55 of the Charter advocate
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 65
Similarly, the policy goals of the Act are to use economic means to ensure
equal rights for South African blacks by inducing the South African
Government to abandon the policy of apartheid. 6 Because the Act constricts
certain economic sectors of the South African economy, however, the Act
may aggravate racial tensions by displacing blacks who work in the affected
sectors.67 Unemployed as a result of the sanctions, South African blacks
may be attracted to violent revolution. 8 Absent domestic violence, however,
the long-term gains, such as equal voting rights by black South Africans,
may outweigh such short-term losses as lost jobs, if the Government of
60. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting imposition of economic sanctions
by United States against South Africa). Crocker's policy of constructive engagement did
accomplish diplomatic success in negotiating limited agreements. Felton, Administrative Role,
supra note 58, at 2340
61. See U.N. CHARTER at art.33 (discussing pacific settlement of disputes). Parties to a
dispute that is likely to endanger international peace and security shall seek a solution by
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or other mutually agreed upon means of dispute settlement.
Id. at art. 33, para. 1. The forms of pacific settlement listed under article 33 do not include
economic sanctions.
62. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (noting constructive engagement qual-
ifies as form of negotiation initiated to settle dispute between United States and South Africa).
63. See supra notes 34 & 40 (noting that sanctions imposed to dismantle apartheid
support Charter because apartheid is against international law and violates Charter).
64. See U.N. CHARTm art. 2, para. 3 (member states shall settle their disputes peacefully,
without endangering international peace and security); id. at art. 33 (member states peacefully
shall settle disputes that might threaten international peace and security); supra note 54 and
accompanying text (noting that apartheid endangers international peace and security).
65. See U.N. CHARm preamble (reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights, dignity,
and worth of human beings, to maintain international peace and security); Id. at art. 55,
para. c (to promote peaceful and friendly relations among nations, United Nations shall
facilitate respect and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction
regarding race).
66. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that purpose of Act is to replace
apartheid in South Africa with nonracial and democratic form of government).
67. See Minter, supra note 2, at 44 (economic sanctions against South Africa most likely
will cause short-term injustice to South African blacks).
68. See id. (economic sanctions against South Africa most likely will result in temporary
economic losses to South African blacks).
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South Africa quickly complies with the Act's demands. 69 Thus, even though
article 33 does not address economic sanctions, and even though the Act
may result in short-term racial violence, economic sanctions against South
Africa are consistent with the Charter because the Act arguably supports
the purposes of the Charter and because the United States is continuing to
negotiate a peaceful settlement through diplomatic pressure.70
In addition to the United Nations Charter, the United States and South
Africa are parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).7'
GATT is a multilateral treaty that regulates international trade.72 The
purpose of GATT is to reduce trade barriers and eliminate discriminatory
treatment in international commercial relations.73 Two of the provisions of
GATT are particularly relevant in assessing the legality under international
law of the United States sanctions against South Africa. 74 Article 11 of Gatt
proscribes certain prohibitions and restrictions on imports and exports
between GATT members. 75 In addition, article 13 of GATT requires that
if a GATT member prohibits or restricts the products of another member
state, the restrictions must apply against all member states.76 Because the
Act prohibits some imports from and exports to South Africa and because
the Act restricts the import-export trade with South Africa alone, and not
69. See id. at 44 (long-term gains by blacks, including equal political representation, will
outweigh short-term injustice to black South Africans prompted by economic sanctions); supra
notes 16-21 (noting Act's five demands).
70. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (article 2(3) of Charter requires pacific
settlement of disputes between member states); supra note 57 and accompanying text (article
33 notes peaceful means of dispute settlement include negotiation or mutually agreed upon
form of redress); supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (economic sanctions initially may
aggravate racial tension, but ultimately will promote international peace and security); supra
notes 34 & 40 and accompanying text (noting that purposes of Charter include achievement
of international cooperation in solving international problems of humanitarian character and
in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms).
71. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATIT), opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. (5) A3 & (6), A1365, T.I.A.S. No. 1200, 55 U.N.T.S. 68.
72. Id.
73. Id. See generally, J. JACKSON, WORLD TADE AND rn LAw OF GATT 53-56 (1969)
(analyzing GATT and international trade).
74. See GATT, supra note 71, at art. 11 (proscribing prohibitions on imports and exports
between GATT members); id. at art. 13 (stating policy of nondiscrimination in trade agreement);
Lillich, supra note 4, at 247-48 (focusing on articles 11 and 13 of GATT in analyzing legality
of economic coercion); Note, supra note 24, at 665-66 (same); Comment, supra note 31, at
1187-89 (same); Note, Legality of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: The Case of
Nicaragua, 43 WAsH. & LEE L. Rnv. 167, 184 (1986) (same).
75. See GATT, supra note 71, at art. 11 (proscribing prohibitions on imports and exports
between GATT members). The provisions of article 11 of GATT apply to any tariff quota
instituted or maintained by any contracting party against any other contracting party. Id. at
art. 11(5); see L. OPPENmzIM, supra note 29, at § 142 (noting that GATT instituted principles
and obligations promoting international trade and removing trade restrictions). To protect
international trade, GATT constitutes a substantial limitation on the freedom of action of the
contracting parties. L. Oppenheim, supra note 29, at § 142.




with all GATT member states, the Act arguably violates articles 11 and 13
of GATT.
77
Although the Act initially appears to violate articles 11 and 13 of GATT,
article 20 of GATT contains exceptions to GATT's general requirement of
nondiscriminatory treatment in trade relations.78 Under article 20 a contract-
ing party may adopt or enforce any measure necessary to protect domestic
or foreign public morals, or human life or health, even if the measure
economically discriminates against another contracting party.7 9 The goal of
the Act is to remove South Africa's apartheid system of government, which
the Security Council has called a crime against humanity. 0 The Act's
provisions thus could fall under the article 20 exceptions protecting public
morals and human life and health.8 ' A state may not act in a discriminatory
manner under article 20's humanitarian exception, however, if the discrim-
inatory treatment is arbitrary, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, or if the alleged offense against public morals, human life, or health
also exists in the sender's country. 2 The restrictions to article 20's human-
itarian exception do not apply to the Act because apartheid does not exist
in the United States and because the trade measures of the Act have no
goal other than to eradicate apartheid. 3 If a target state, however, believes
that the discriminatory treatment is arbitrary or unjustified the target state
can seek redress under article 23 of GATT.84 Thus, if South Africa considers
the sanctions in the Act to breach GATT, then South Africa can file a
protest under article 23 of GATT and seek a determination of legality from
the original contracting parties.85 Assuming South Africa does file, a ma-
jority of the original contracting parties probably will follow the United
77. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086-
1116 (prohibiting certain economic interaction between United States and South Africa); GATT,
supra note 71, at arts. 11, 13 (proscribing prohibitions on imports and exports between GATT
members and stating policy of nondiscrimination).
78. See GATr, supra note 71, at art. 20 (containing general exceptions to rule against
discrimination between GATT members).
79. See GATr, supra note 71, at art. 20(l)(a), (b) (condoning discrimination for non-
violent motives such as protection of public morals and human life). Precise definitions for
the words in article 20 of GATT created trouble for the contracting parties. J. JACKSON, supra
note 73, at 745.
80. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing apartheid system of government
in South Africa); supra note 14 (purpose of Act is to promote establishment of nonracial and
democratic form of government for South Africa); supra note 54 (noting Security Council's
statment that apartheid is crime against humanity endangering international peace and security).
81. See GATT, supra note 71, at art. 20(b) (condoning trade discrimination for nonviolent
motives such as protection of public morals and human life).
82. See GATT, supra note 71, at art. 20 (condoning discriminatory treatment to serve
humanitarian ends that is not arbitrary, unjustified, or disguised restriction" on international
trade).
83. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting restrictions to article 20's human-
itarian intervention). See also supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting Act's policy goals).
84. GAT, supra note 71, at art. 23.
85. See id. (greivance procedure under GATT).
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Nations view that apartheid is an offense against humanity and the United
States sanctions will qualify for article 20's humanitarian exception.16 There-
fore, although the Act contravenes articles 11 and 13 of GATT, article 20
justifies the sanctions under GATT.
7
In addition to the Charter and GATT, the United States sanctions
against South Africa affect the.Air Transport Services Agreement Between
the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of
South Africa Relating to Air Services Between Their Respective Territories
(Air Transport Agreement), which is a bilateral treaty of air travel between
South Africa and the United States.88 The Air Transport Agreement, signed
May 23, 1947, granted reciprocal landing rights in the United States and
South Africa to one or more air carriers of each state. 9 A purpose of the
Air Transport Agreement was to stimulate international air travel as a means
of promoting international understanding and good will. 90 According to the
Air Transport Agreement, either state may terminate the treaty upon notice
to the other state. 9' The termination is to become effective one year after
the nonterminating state receives the notice, unless the terminating state
withdraws its notice before the expiration date. 92 In compliance with the
Air Transport Agreement's termination provisions, the Act provided that
the United States Secretary of State notify the Government of South Africa
that the United States planned to terminate the Air Transport Agreement. 9
The Act also authorized the Secretary of Transportation to prohibit landing
rights to aircraft owned or operated by South African citizens following
86. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting Security Council's determination
that apartheid is crime against humanity); supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting
GATT's article 20 humanitarian exception to GATT's general requirement of nondiscriminatory
treatment in trade relations). See J. JACKSON, supra note 73, at 178-87 (noting broad range
of possible redress under article 23 of GATT). Under article 23 of Gatt, the range of possible
redress includes compensation, suspension of the discriminatory measure, suspension of the
contracting party from GATT, or any other measure deemed appropriate by the contracting
parties. Id. Both the United States and South Africa are original contracting parties to GATT.
Id. at 899.
87. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text (noting discussion of GATT).
88. Air Transport Services Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Union of South Africa Relating to Air Services Between
Their Respective Territories, May 23, 1947, 61 Stat. 3057, T.I.A.S. No. 1639, supra note 12;
see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (describing Act's termination of Air Transport
Agreement).
89. Air Transport Agreement, supra note 12, at annex 1-3.
90. Id. at annex 4.
91. Id. at art. 11.
92. Id.
93. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 306(b)(1),
100 Stat. 1086, 1100; Air Transport Agreement, supra note 12, at art. 11 (Air Transport
Agreement to terminate one year after date of receipt of notice to terminate by other contracting
party unless notice withdrawn by agreement in interim). Secretary of State George Shultz gave
South Africa notice of termination of the Air Transport Agreement by the United States on
October 8, 1986. Dmry' ST. BULL. 84, 87 (December 1986). The notice became effective October
10, 1987. Id.
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termination of the Air Transport Agreement. 94 Furthermore, the Act directed
the Secretary of Transportation to restrict landing rights following termi-
nation in South Africa of aircraft owned or operated by United States
citizens. 95
The United States has complied with the termination provisions of the
Air Transport Agreement. 96 On October 8, 1986, Secretary of State George
Shultz gave notice that the Air Transport Agreement would terminate on
October 10, 1987.97 Before the termination becomes effective, both United
States and South African airlines may continue to operate between the two
states. During the interim, the United States can withdraw the notice if
South Africa complies with the termination provisions of the Act. 99 The
Act, therefore, does not violate the United States treaty obligations under
the Air Transport Agreement because the United States has complied with
the termination provisions and the United States is not violating any
provisions of the Air Transport Agreement during this period. °°
In addition to treaties, customary international law can help determine
the status under international law of the United States sanctions against
94. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 306(b)(2), 100
Stat. 1086, 1100. Section 306(b)(2) of the Act provided that the Secretary of Transportation
prohibit aircraft owned or operated by the Government of South Africa or by South African
Citizens from engaging in air transportation with respect to the United States. Id. Under
section 306(a)(2), the Act authorized the president within ten days following enactment of the
Act, to direct the Secretary of Transportation to revoke the right of any air carrier designated
by the Government of South Africa to provide service pursuant to the Air Transport Agreement.
Id. § 306(a)(2), at 1100. Secretary of State George Schultz gave South Africa notice of
termination of the Air Transport Agreement by the United States effective from October 8,
1986. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting termination of Air Transport Agree-
ment). On October 27, 1986 the President issued Executive Order 12,571 directing the Secretary
of Transportation to comply with section 306(a)(2) of the Act. Exec. Order No. 12,571 51
Fed. Reg. 39,505 (1986). Elizabeth Dole, the Secretary of Transportation, accordingly issued
Department of Transportation Final Order 86-11-29 (Final Order). After review by the
President, the Final Order, revoking South African Airways landing rights in the United States,
became effective November 16, 1986. Subsequently, South African Airways sought an emer-
gency delay of the Final Order before the District of Columbia Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals. South African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Court
of Appeals held that the issuance of the Final Order was a valid exercise of Congressionally
mandated authority not in violation of the Act. Id. On October 13, 1987 the Supreme Court
of the United States denied certiorari. South African Airways v. Dole, 98 L. Ed. 2d. 188, 108
S. Ct. 229 (1987).
95. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 306(b)(3), 100
Stat. 1086, 1100.
96. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting Secretary of State George Shulz
gave South Africa notice of termination in compliance with Air Transport Agreement).
97. Id.
98. Air Transport Agreement, supra note 12, at art. 11; see supra, notes 91-93 and
accompanying text (noting termination provision of Air Transport Agreement).
99. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text (noting termination provisions of the
Act); supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (noting termination provisions of Air Transport
Agreement).
100. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting Act's compliance with termination
procedure of Air Transport Agreement); supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (noting
termination provisions of Air Transport Agreement).
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South Africa.'01 A particular mode of transnational conduct may attain the
status of a rule of international law if states recognize the mode of
interaction by constant and uniform usage.102 An example of a rule of
international law created by the practice of states is the duty of states to
refrain from the use of force against the sovereign authority of another
state. 103 The basis for rules of customary international law concerns not
only the forms of conduct in which states engage, but also why states
engage in certain forms of conduct.104 If states act out of a sense of legal
duty, rather than for another reason such as political expediency, that action
may attain the status of a rule of customary international law. 05 The
doctrine of Opinio juris sive necessitatus (opinio juris) requires that states
adhere to certain forms of international conduct out of a sense of legal
obligation before that conduct may attain the status of a rule of international
law.' 6 In addition, other states must acquiesce in the particular habitual
practice at issue for the practice to attain the status of a customary rule of
international law. 1' 7 An habitual practice of states, therefore, may rise to
101. See ICJ Statute, supra note 25, at art. 38(1)(b) (international custom, as evidence of
general practice accepted as law, is source of international law); supra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text (noting customary international law among sources of international law for
purposes of determining legality of transnational interactions).
102. See Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-77 (constant and uniform
usage is basis of customary rule of international law); see also M. AxEHU sT, supra note 25,
at 27-28 (repetition over period of time is basis of customary international law); J.L. BriERLy,
supra note 40, at 61 (constant usage over time is basis of customary rule of international law).
To attain the status of a rule of international law, a practice of states cannot have major
inconsistencies. M. AKEHURST, supra note 25, at 27-28. Major inconsistencies are large amounts
of practice that go against the rule in question, while minor inconsistencies are small amounts
of contrary practice. Id. at 28. When no contrary practice to an alleged rule of international
law exists, a small amount of practice may attain the status of a rule, even if only a small
number of states follow the practice and for a short time. Id.
103. L. OPPENBEiM, supra note 29, at §§ 125-126 (state is not allowed to send its troops
or to exercise act of legislative or judicial administration into or through foreign territory
without permission).
104. See M. AEr~usr, supra note 25, at 29 (explaining pyschological basis of customary
rules of international law).
105. See Asylum Case (Colum. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277. (sense of legal obligation
accompanies customary rules of international law).
106. See M. Axmnmsr, supra note 25, at 29-30 (discussing opinio juris as requirement
for creation of customary rules of international law).
107. See id. When a state follows an alleged rule, the adherence must result from a sense
of obligation or duty. Id. A state may show adherence to a rule out of a sense of duty by
express acknowledgment. Id. Conversely, if interested states condemn as illegal a state's failure
to act in a manner required by the alleged rule, the condemnation may help to prove the
obligatory nature of the conduct which, in turn, helps to establish opinio juris. Id. at 30.
Opinio juris, however, does not presuppose that all rules of international law stem from legal
duty. Id. at 29. Permissive rules of customary law are rules that states may act in a particular
manner even though such conduct is not obligatory upon the state. Id. An example of a
permissive rule is that a state may prosecute foreigners for crimes committed within the states
territory. Id. Lack of protest by an interested state that a state's conduct is illegal may help
to prove the existence of a permissive rule of international law. Id.
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the status of customary international law if states recognize the practice by
constant and uniform usage, engage in the practice out of a sense of legal
duty, and other states acquiesce in the practice. One rule of customary
international law is the duty of states not to intervene in the sovereign
affairs of other states. 08 Intervention -that violates international law is a
dictatorial or coercive interference by one state in the domestic or foreign
affairs of another state, which impairs that state's sovereignty.'
9 The broad
108. L. OPparPaoA, supra note 29, at § 134. Intervention is not always illegal and may
take place by right, such as to enforce treaty obligations. Id. at § 135(3); Bull, Introduction,
in INTERVENTION IN WoRLD Poimcs, supra note 35, at 1. The principle of a state's sovereign
right to determine that state's own internal and external affairs forms the basis of the principle
of nonintervention. See C. THoMAs, supra note 45, at 1-3 (discussing interrelationship of
principles of sovereignty and nonintervention); Comment, supra note 31, at 1166 (duty of
nonintervention guarantees principle of sovereignty). The principle of state sovereignty, rec-
ognized by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, supports the territorial integrity and legal equality
of legitimate states. See C. THoMAs, supra note 45, at 34 (discussing principle of sovereignty).
Sovereignty also includes the recognition of the right of a state to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over that state's own citizens. See J.L. BRIRiY, supra note 40, at 1, 47 (right of state to treat
state's citizens as state determines is element of state sovereignty); Comment, supra note 31,
at 1166 (same). The duty of nonintervention is a corollary to sovereignty because interference
by one state into the affairs of another is an encroachment upon the latter state's sovereign
authority to determine that state's own affairs. See J.L. BRiERLY, supra note 40, at 402 (basis
of duty of nonintervention is respect for state sovereign authority to determine own internal
and external afffairs); C. THom.s, supra note 45, at 3 (same); Comment, supra note 31, at
1166 (duty of nonintervention prohibits one state from interfering in another state's affairs in
manner that impairs latter's independence). Intervention violates international law if the
intervention involves force, is against the target state's wishes, and constrains the independent
will and decision-making capability of a sovereign state. See L. OPPEN iM, supra note 29, at
§ 134 (intervention is dictatorial interference and does not include intervention in cooperation
with target state); A. THoMAs & A. THOmAS, NomN1raRVwNTrON 71-72 (1956) (noting definition
of intervention); C. THomAs, supra note 45, at 21 (coercive attempt to usurp decision-making
capability of sovereign state by another state is act of intervention that violates duty of
nonintervention); Comment, supra note 31, at 1166 (international persuasion is impermissible
if uninvited by target state and if for purpose of constraining sovereign will of target).
In addition to the duty of nonintervention, racial nondiscrimination may have become a
norm of customary international law. See 0. OzouR supra note 5, at 3-21 (noting that Charter
provisions, numerous international human rights instruments, International Law Commission
and ICJ statements, and state declarations against apartheid, are tantamount to creation of
duty of racial nondiscrimination); supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting provisions of
Charter and numerous international human rights instruments that support racial nondiscrim-
ination).
109. 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FoRCE By STATES 44 (1963).
Intervention consists of dictatorial interference by one state into the internal affairs or
sovereignty of another state. Id. Diplomatic protest or official comment concerning the internal
affairs of another state constitutes dictatorial intervention. Id. See J. L. BRIERLY, supra note
40, at 402 (intervention consists of dictatorial interference in domestic or foreign affairs of
another state impairing that state's independence or sovereignty); Bull, supra note 99, at I
(intervention consists of dictatorial or coercive interference into sphere of jurisdiction of
sovereign state or independent political community); see generally L. OPPENHEIM, supra note
29, at §§ 134-140 (intervention is dictatorial interference into internal affairs of one state by
another state, to maintain or alter target states sovereign authority). But see L. OPPENHEIM,
supra note 29, at § 134 (good offices and mediation is not dictatorial intervention and, hence,
does not constitute intervention).
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construction of dictatorial interference includes any interference against a
state's political, economic, and cultural elements. 110 Sovereignty is a state's
authority to regulate activities in that state's own territory and activities of
that state's citizens, as well as the right to determine that state's own internal
and external affairs."1 Intervention does not violate international law when
the target state invites the intervention or when the intervention is in self-
defense.
112
Under the principle of nonintervention- the United States economic
sanctions against South Africa initially appear to violate customary inter-
national law because the sanctions impair South Africa's sovereign authority
to regulate the activities of South Africa's black population and South
Africa's right to determine South Africa's own internal affairs.1 The stated
purpose of the Act is to use any effective means to remove the apartheid
system of government in South Africa.11 4 The Act is an uninvited attempt
to shape South Africa's decision-making authority and, therefore, violates
the principle of nonintervention.'" 5
Although the sanctions against South Africa constitute an intervention,
the purpose of the Act may justify the sanctions under the doctrine of
110. Short Article, Humanitarian Intervention in International Law: The French Interven-
tion in Syria Re-examined, 35 INT'Lr & Comr'. L. Q. 183, 189 n. 37. Intervention does not
consist necessarily of armed force or the threat of armed force. Id; see L. OPPENrIM, supra
note 29, at § 168(f)(c) (stating that recommendations calculated to exercise direct pressure and
likely to be reinforced constitute intervention). Intervention may consist of coercion by one
state of another state to subordinate or usurp the target state's sovereign rights, without
recourse to armed force. See Declaration on the Inadmisibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G. A. Res. 2131,
20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14)(1408th plen. mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966) (interference
that violates target state's sovereignty constitutes intervention). Intervention motivated by a
desire to usurp a state's sovereign rights is consistent with dictatorial intervention. Short
Article, supra note 110, at 189 n. 37.
Ill. L. OPpENmms, supra note 29, §§ 123-124, at 285-89. Sovereignty consists of three
qualities. Id. First, a sovereign state has external independence to manage its international
affairs according to that state's own discretion. Id. An example of external independence is
the freedom of action to enter into alliances and conclude treaties. Id. Second, a sovereign
state has internal independence to manage its own internal affairs. Id. An example of internal
independence is the freedom to adopt a constitution of the state's choice. Id. Last, a sovereign
state has territorial supremacy to exercise supreme authority over all persons and things within
its territory. Id. A consequence of territorial supremacy is the power of a state to treat its
subjects as the state chooses, subject to international obligations. Id. In particular, concerning
the limitations on a state's territorial supremacy, a Member state of the United Nations must
obey the general obligations of the United Nations Charter concerning human rights and
fundamental freedoms. Id.
f12. Id. § 125; see supra note 11 and accompanying text (detailing what constitutes
sovereign authority).
113. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (purpose of Act is to dismantle apartheid
system of government in South Africa); supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text (detailing
what constitutes nonintervention).
114. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Act).
115. See id. (discussing purpose of Act); supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text
(discussing principle of nonintervention).
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humanitarian intervention.11 6 Humanitarian intervention, an exception to
the principle of nonintervention, is intervention by one state into the affairs
of a target state to protect the inhabitants of the target state from arbitrary
and abusive treatment by that state's government, which treatment exceeds
the boundaries of legitimate sovereign authority.'1 7 Humanitarian interven-
116. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Act); infra notes
117-26 and accompanying text (discussing humanitarian intervention).
117. E.C. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1921) (humanitarian inter-
vention is justified use of force to protect inhabitants of state from unjust and arbitrary
treatment by that state's sovereign). Humanitarian intervention loses justification if the inter-
vention becomes self-serving instead of addressing human rights violations. See Hoffman, The
Problem of Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLmcs, supra note 35 at 24 (noting
that problem with principle of humanitarian intervention is knowing juncture at which it
becomes self-serving). An example of when humanitarian intervention has become self-serving
is the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, which began as an attempt to remove the barbaric
Pol Pot regime and ended in the imposition of an equally nefarious Vietnamese neo-colonial
rule. Id. at 24. States have invoked humanitarian intervention for commercial and strategic
purposes. See, eg., BROWNEE, supra note 109 at 338-40; Franck and Rodley, supra note 46,
at 279-85 (noting circumstances when states have invoked humanitarian intervention).
Although humanitarian intervention is a generally accepted principle of international law,
proponents of a broad interpretation of article 2(4) have maintained that humanitarian
intervention violates article 2(4) of the Charter. See Akehurst, supra note 35, at 104 (stating
armed humanitarian intervention is illegal under article 2(4)). Proponents of a broad interpre-
tation of article 2(4) consider intervention for humanitarian purposes illegal for three reasons.
First, article 2(4) forbids any type intervention, including humanitarian intervention. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text (noting broad interpretation of article 2(4) includes any form
of aggression in article 2(4) prohibition against use of force). Second, to allow unilateral
intervention by one state into the internal affairs of another state for humanitarian purposes
creates the potential for unscrupulous states to abuse the privilege which, in turn, undermines
the Charter's authority. See Fonteyne, supra note 35, at 68-69 (allowing intervention by one
state into sovereign affairs of another state for humanitarian reasons creates opportunities for
abuse by states intervening for self-serving ends under guise of humanitarian intervention,
undermining Charter's authority). Last, the proponents of the broad interpretation of article
2(4) disagree with the argument that humanitarian intervention falls outside the purview of
article 2(4) because humanitarian intervention does not seek to invade the territorial integrity
or political independence of the target state and is not inconsistent with the purposes of the
U.N. Charter. See J. SToNE, supra note 36, at 43, 95-96 (stating that article 2(4) does not
forbid humanitarian intervention because humanitarian intervention does not seek to infringe
sovereign authority of target and is not contrary to purposes of United Nations); Reisman,
Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in Hu mANTtN INTERVENTION ANrD nm U.N.
167, 177 (Lillich ed. 1973). Proponents of the broad interpretation of article 2(4) state that
the narrow view considers a state's motives and goals and that article 2(4) is not meant to
consider a state's motives or goals. Fonteyne, supra note 35, at 73. Further, proponents of
the broad view maintain that all forms of humanitarian intervention constitute a violation of
the target state's territorial integrity and political independence, especially where the announced
goal of the intervenor is to rescue an entire population from systematic persecution by the
target state. See Akehurst supra note 35, at 105 (population rescues necessarily change target
government's character as well as status of territory under which persecuted citizens had lived);
infra notes 117-26 and accompanying text (discussing humanitarian intervention). Proponents
of the broad interpretation note that article 2(4) is a total ban on any use of armed force
because "territorial integrity" in article 2(4) means "territorial inviolability." See L. OPPEM-
imrm, supra note 46, at 154 (stating "territorial integrity" and "political independence" means
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tion has four generally recognized prerequisites." 8 First, the intervenor
cannot attempt to establish a new sovereign authority in the target state,
but only can limit the internal scope of the present sovereign's power." 9
Second, gross violations of human rights must exist in the target state and
the local government must be either unable or unwilling to correct the
problem. 12 Third, the intervenor must use force that is proportional to the
alleged wrong.' 2' Finally, the intervention must be contrary to the wishes
of the target state and, thus, constitute dictatorial interference in the affairs
of the target government.'2
The United States economic sanctions against South Africa qualify as
an example of humanitarian intervention. The United States desires that
territorial inviolability). But see L. OPPENimim supra note 46, at 154 (stating article 2(4)
prohibition absolute except to fulfill obligations of Charter or in self-defense); L. OPPENHEIM,
supra note 29, at § 137 (stating humanitarian intervention is legally permissable); supra notes
34 & 40 and accompanying text (noting purposes of United Nations).
Proponents of a broad interpretation of article 2(4) have advocated several solutions to
rectify the problem of a state persecuting its own citizens and still adhering to the broad
interpretation of article 2(4). See Akehurst supra note 35, at 111-12 (international organizations
only should solve human rights violations); Fonteyne supra note 35, at 73-75 (article 2(4)
obligations should cease when state undertakes humanitarian intervention). One proponent's
solution is to create international collective machinery specifically to address episodes of a
sovereign state persecuting its own citizens. Akehurst, supra note 35, at 111-12. Fearing that
a foreign state acting unilaterally may cause more harm than benefits, and conscious of
differing world attitudes of what may constitute adequate human tights, the proponent of the
solution advocates the creation of an international organization to investigate and implement
appropriate remedies. Id. at 110-12. Another proponent's solution to the problem of a state
persecuting its own citizens is to by-pass the Charter. Fonteyne, supra note 35, at 73-75.
Balancing the United Nations goals of world conflict minimalization against protection of
human rights, the proponent of this solution has recommended that the United Nations
temporarily relieve a state of the restraints and obligations of article 2(4) and allow that state
to intervene in the target state for humanitarian ends. Id. The solution, however, appears to
undermine the rationale that article 2(4) forbids all forms of intervention. Finally, another
solution is to adopt the narrow interpretation that article 2(4) does not encompass economic
intervention. See Lillich, supra note 4, at 234-36 (detailing narrow interpretation that article
2(4) does not forbid economic intervention); infra note 39 and accompanying text (same).
Under a narrow interpretation of article 2(4), humanitarian intervention is a legal exception
to the general duty of nonintervention. See supra notes 107-16 (doctrine of humanitarian
intervention is viable and justifies any intervention the Act may impose).
118. See J.L. BRiERLY, supra note 40, at 402 (stating characteristics of humanitarian
intervention).
119. Hoffman, The Problem of Intervention, supra note 35 at 26.
120. See L. OPPENmiM, supra note 29, at § 137 (humanitarian intervention requires gross
violations of human rights in target state that target state is unwilling or unable to alleviate);
Short Article, supra note 110, at 186-7 n. 29(same).
121. See Comment, supra note 31, at 1173-74 (intervention must be proportional to crime
committed by target government); Short Article, supra note 110, at 186-87 n. 29 (armed force
is characteristic of humanitarian intervention).
122. Short Article, supra note 110, at 186-87 n. 29 (humanitarian intervention must
amount to dictatorial interference in target government's affairs). See supra note 109 and
accompanying text (discussing dictatorial intervention). Nondictatorial intervention does not
need the label "humanitarian" to achieve legitimacy.
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black South Africans receive adequate legal rights but publically has not
supported a replacement of the present sovereign authority in South Africa
with any specific form of sovereign authority.'2 Further, the United Nations
has determined that gross violations of human rights exist in South Africa
and the South African government appears to be unable or unwilling to
rectify the problem.124 In addition, the use of sanctions by the United States
is proportionate to the gravity of the harm presented by apartheid in South
Africa.' s Economic sanctions are a nonviolent form of pressure to induce
a change in widespread systemic transgression of basic human rights. Finally,
the South African Government did not elicit the United States sanctions
against South Africa and, thus, the sanctions constitute dictatorial interfer-
ence in the affairs of the South African jGovernment. 126 The sanctions,
therefore, are an example of humanitarian intervention and do not violate
international law.
The economic sanctions imposed by the United States against South
Africa in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act do not violate international
law. Specifically the Act does not violate the U.N. Charter, GATT or the
Air Transport Agreement between South Africa and the United States. 127
Even though the Act provides for discrimination in the regulation of exports
and imports with South Africa, the Act does not violate GATT because
GATT justifies trade discrimination prompted by humanitarian interests.
28
Furthermore, although the Act's sanctions constitute a dictatorial interfer-
ence in the sovereign right of South Africa to order South African society,
the intervention is justified on humanitarian grounds. 2 9 If South Africa
123. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting purposes and goals of Act).
124. See supra note 54 (noting Security Council's recognition of apartheid as crime against
humanity); 0. OzauR, supra note 5, at 20 (noting that United Nations considers apartheid
gross and persistent violation of human rights).
125. See supra notes 36 & 46 and accompanying text (noting that under narrow interpre-
tation of article 2(4) of Charter economic sanctions do not constitute "force"); supra notes
67-69 and accompanying text (noting that quick compliance with Act's demands will outweigh
negative impact of sanctions); supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text (noting Act's five
demands). But see supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (noting that dictatorial interven-
tion may include economic coercion).
126. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting goal of Act is to dismantle
apartheid); supra note 109 and accompanying text (stating that intervention impedes sovereignty
of target government); supra note 111 and accompanying text (describing sovereignty as
authority of state to regulate that state's territory, citizens, and internal and external affairs).
127. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text (proposing that Act does not violate
article 2(4) of Charter); supra note 52-70 and accompanying text (proposing that Act does not
violate articles 2(3) or 33 of Charter, and Act supports purposes of United Nations); supra
notes 71-87 and accompanying text (proposing that Act does not violate Gatt); supra notes
88-100 and accompanying text (stating Act does not violate Air Transport Agreement).
128. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that Act contravenes trade regu-
lations of GATT); supra note 79 and accompanying text (noting GATT justifies trade
discrimination prompted by humanitarian concerns).
129. See supra notes 108-10 & 113-115 and accompanying text (noting Act constitutes
dictatorial interference); supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text (justifying Act as human-
itarian intervention).
19871 1441
1442 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
dismantles apartheid and alleviates the problems caused by widespread
systemic transgressions of human rights, the United States will lift the
sanctions.1"0 If not the President of the United States may impose additional
sanctions on the importation of South African diamonds and strategic
minerals.' 3 ' Created by Congress and expressive of United States domestic
opinion, the Act wields economic power to shape the fate of South African
society.
Accelerated global economic interdependence may lead to a redefinition
of a world order based upon the principles of sovereignty and
nonintervention 32 For now, the consensual nature of customary international
law allows moral suasion to justify economic invasions of sovereign au-
thority.
WnILLIM S. MADDOX
130. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text (noting that if South Africa meets
Act's five demands United States will lift sanctions).
131. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting additional sanctions provided by
Act).
132. See supra notes 45 & 108 and accompanying text (noting view that increasing world
economic interdependence erodes state sovereignty and nonintervention as reliable principles
supporting international law and international interaction among nations).
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